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Abstract
This paper provides an overview and synthesis of the results from recent studies of how different types of land
use regulations affect land development incentives. The presentation is nontechnical and focuses on uncovering
general principles for the dynamic effects of such policies. It explains why the risk of regulation leads to faster
development of unregulated land and how the effect on structural densities reflects the underlying pattern of
growth in the demand for land by competing uses. It also discusses how the general pattern of timing and
density responses for regulated property reflect the same growth patterns in demand.
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1. Introduction
Recent research on land use restrictions emphasizes the role of regulation adopted over
time in the urban development process. The intertemporal perspective of this work
reveals how regulation alters the pace and pattern of land development across the urban
area, with varying effects on both regulated and unregulated property reflecting the
pattern of growth or decline in the underlying demands for land by competing land uses.
The results are novel in that they fundamentally differ from the implications of static
analyses, yet this survey reveals that they are surprisingly robust across the different
types of land use regulations studied. This paper summarizes and discusses the results of
a series of recent papers studying development prohibition, development moratoria,
restrictions on allowed use, and development fees.1 It provides a self-contained dis-
cussion of key results and relationships that is geared to the nontechnical specialist,
especially to individuals with a policy perspective.
One goal of this survey is to stimulate further research on the issues surrounding the
design and evaluation of regulation in a dynamic context, including new effort to derive
robust dynamic efficiency rules. Another goal is to stimulate interest in making the
dynamic land development literature more accessible to an audience that needs to
incorporate dynamic insights into their world-view: economists and planners with policy
interests and those who teach them.
The underlying theme of this paper is that policy design and evaluation requires a firm
grounding in how urban capital and real estate markets respond to different types of land
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use and tax policies. The longevity of capital improvements to land and the relatively
high costs required to modify structures and infrastructure once put into place means that
market participants choose from alternative projects whose net returns extend into the
indefinite future. The key to understanding capital and real property markets is to rec-
ognize their inherently dynamic nature. Because urban real estate plays a central role in
urban economies, it is perhaps not surprising that dynamic or intertemporal analysis has
become a widely used tool in modern urban economics.2 But the dynamic perspective
needs to attain greater prominence in the modern planning and policy tool kit as well.
Therefore, one task for this paper is to illustrate how the dynamic or intertemporal view
of the urban development process leads to insights that are not evident in the traditional
static approach.
This discussion addresses two related issues in land use regulations. The first issue
concerns what we know about how the threat of regulation affects the pace and pattern of
urban development when urban development is irreversible. The second issue concerns
how constitutional and legal constraints on policy makers can alter the intended effects
of land use controls. The starting point of this line of literature recognizes that the market
response to regulation as actually implemented may differ considerably from the
ultimate policy goal.
Nonetheless, there is one lesson that keeps popping up in the recent literature that can
be troubling when designing land use policies. Specifically, introducing dynamic
considerations moves such policy design into the world of (at best) second best, since
a single policy rule is not likely to be efficient across space and time. The adverse
possession literature provides an explicit example. Baker et al. (2001) derive the efficient
period for adverse possession, that is, the efficient rule defining how long it should take
for an individual to acquire property by squatting or adverse possession. That paper
shows that land on the fringe of a growing urban area will have a different efficient time
period for adverse possession than will land deep in the agricultural hinterland. And even
more troubling for advocates of efficient policy design, Miceli et al. (2003) use a
monocentric model of a growing urban area to show that the optimal adverse possession
rule varies with distance from the central business district. Given the practical restriction
that property rights be defined uniformly within jurisdictions, these papers illustrate that
it is likely that the first-best adverse possession rule simply cannot be implemented.
Although the issue of second-best welfare analysis has not been fully addressed yet in
the dynamic land regulation literature, the results of the two adverse possession studies
are suggestive. It appears reasonable to expect that a similar type of spatial variation will
permeate the design of dynamically efficient land use policy. The dynamic perspective
will likely consign land use regulation to the world of second best when it is not feasible
to sculpt regulations to individual parcels of land in the same jurisdiction.
This paper focuses on recent work with a common theme: how does viewing land
development as a dynamic process lead to different regulatory consequences? There is an
established literature concerned with tax effects on land development, some of which
uses the same general framework underlying the regulation models explained here.3
Aside from acknowledging this cross-pollination up front, though, this paper focuses
more narrowly on dynamic issues surrounding land use regulation.
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This discussion is concerned with the effects of regulation on investment incentives in
a dynamic context. The line between the concepts of eminent domain and regulation is
somewhat blurred, however, so some comments on eminent domain are in order at this
point. When exercising eminent domain, governments take the entire value of an asset
out of the hands of its owner. While the owner does not lose title to his asset under
regulation, regulation is similar to a Bpartial taking^ in that it eliminates some, but not
all, asset value from the owner’s control. Yet, eminent domain and regulation are worlds
apart in terms of constitutional protection. While the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution obligates governments to compensate owners for the value of real estate
taken by eminent domain, it does not impose a similar duty on governments that
effectively take only part of asset values by regulation.
Given the similarities between eminent domain and regulation, it is not surprising that
some of the eminent domain literature is properly viewed as antecedent to the regulation
issues examined here. While Blume et al. (1984), Fischel and Shapiro (1988), and Miceli
(1991) do not adopt an explicitly dynamic perspective, they do concentrate on how the
threat of eminent domain distorts investment incentives. Their focus is on how structural
density decisions are distorted by compensation rules given that investors cannot know
future government eminent domain decisions with certainty. Innes (1997) sets aside
structural density concerns to focus on the investment timing question. Like the previous
papers, Innes pays close attention to the normative consequences of compensation rules.
The positive analysis, however, is interesting in light of the regulation results examined
below. In particular, Innes finds that full compensation to owners renders the market
impervious to the threat of taking by eminent domain.4
The dynamic land use regulation literature considers neither compensation (since none
is constitutionally required) nor the risk of losing property through eminent domain
(Geltner et al. 1996; Riddiough, 1997; Titman, 1985; Turnbull, 1991, 2002, 2004a).
Instead, these papers study how the risk of different types of land use regulation can
affect planned investment timing when the government is free to exercise regulatory
takings. Titman (1985) and Turnbull (1991) consider density restrictions that are certain,
but imposed in an explicitly dynamic setting. Both find deviations from the static
certainty perspective. Other papers follow the lead of the eminent domain literature
mentioned earlier, envisioning regulation as a stochastic process. Riddiough (1997)
applies a financial options simulation model to calculate how threatening to prohibit or
delay development alters asset values and investment timing incentives. Turnbull (2002,
2004a) introduce the interplay among capital density and investment timing incentives,
focusing on density restrictions like zoning and development moratoria.
The discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a rationale for dynamic
analysis in land use issues, and lays out a simplified version of a standard framework
used to explain many of the subsequent results. Section 3 discusses the relationship
between regulation and property rights in the US. Section 4 examines the effects of
development prohibitions while Section 5 looks at development moratoria. Section 6
discusses the effects of restrictions on allowed density, like zoning, when such
restrictions are known with certainty, but the demand for land may be certain or
uncertain. Section 7 turns to the issue of uncertain restrictions on allowed density.
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Section 8 relates the effects of regulatory risk discussed in the previous sections
to the issue of ownership risk in general. Since development fees are increasingly
popular tools that are often justified as a way to promote efficient development, they are
addressed in this paper in Section 9. A summary and conclusions appear in Section 10.
2. A simple model of land development
The increasing role of dynamic analysis in urban economics is motivated in part by the
fact that urban growth and economic development are inherently dynamic processes.
Urban areas exhibit continuous change: population or employment are growing (or
declining), interior sites are being abandoned or redeveloped for different uses, existing
structures and infrastructure are constantly aging, and the fringe of the urban area is
expanding. The static view of the urban economy explains these changes as
disequilibrium adjustment to shifting demands and supplies. In contrast, the dynamic
view envisions the constantly changing urban area as the equilibrium outcome, a time
path of population or employment and land use patterns. Although static analysis does
lead to insights that serve as an important starting point, deeper understanding of the
process of urban growth or decline requires the dynamic or intertemporal perspective.
The economic arguments traditionally used to justify land use controls and regulations
are static in nature; they do not incorporate the intertemporal adjustments that market
participants make in response to policy proposals. Recent research in this area exploits
the dynamic perspective emphasizing what, where, and particularly when land devel-
opment occurs. This research provides a basis for beginning to understand the rationale
for and effects of land use regulation in a continually changing metropolitan economy.
A useful consequence of viewing economic growth as a continuing dynamic process is
that it draws attention to political forces underlying the demand for land use regulation
quite apart from mitigating market failure. Successful urban development itself creates
interest group pressure for curtailing further growth. As the metropolitan economy grows
over time, the population grows, largely through in-migration to the metropolitan area,
which creates incentives for residents of jurisdictions to use the regulatory power of their
governments to gain at the expense of others by Bclosing the door^ behind themselves
after they have settled an area. Thriving urban areas are growing urban areas. The
relatively greater opportunities and higher standards of living pull in population from
elsewhere. There is nonetheless an incentive by those who have already reside in the
thriving urban area to thwart this population growth to maintain the higher standard of
living that is the source of attraction for immigration into the metropolitan area.
Individuals find it appealing to use their first-mover advantage, relying on the machinery
of their local governments to preserve the ambiance of their residential enclaves with
surrounding green spaces or prevent aesthetically unappealing commercial develop-
mentVin a way that shifts the cost of such regulation onto other parties. As explained
below, some of the concerns of existing residents truly reflect market failures. Other
arguments for growth control policies, however, fall into the realm of rent-seeking, using
the public sector to garner benefits while the cost is borne by others.
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One factor that is typically under-appreciated by policy makers is the future signalling
effect of current policy decisions; a policy enacted today for a particular situation affects
investors’ expectations of future policies. Even though the current policy, say a
prohibition of development for a particular parcel of land, may be in response to a very
specific problem, the fact that the policy maker has obtained the power to enact such a
prohibition makes it impossible for the policy maker to credibly commit to not imposing
a similar prohibition on some other property in the futureVeven if the policy maker truly
believes (at the time) that such a policy will never be enacted again. As a result, active
involvement in the development process injects another source of uncertainty into the
mix already facing private investors: regulatory risk. This regulatory risk is the point of
departure for some of the land policy research discussed below.
It is convenient at this point to present a simple model that will be useful for
illustrating how regulation affects investment incentives. This is a partial equilibrium
framework that focuses on the decisions to develop a particular parcel of land.
Development, once undertaken, is irreversible. Of course, different tracts of land are
going to have different development options because they have different locations within
the same urban land market (Fujita, 1982; Wheaton, 1982; Turnbull, 1988a, b).
Nonetheless, the model used throughout most of this paper has the virtue of simplicity
without losing its ability to explain the basic economic relationships that drive the
conclusions in the more general models.
The notation is defined as follows:
S = structural density on the unit of land once developed (buildings and
improvements per unit of land);
R(S, t) = land rent during time period t for the plot of land developed with
structural density S;
C(S) = cost of developing the land with structural density S;
T = time period during which the plot of land is developed;
w = land rent during period t for the plot of land when undeveloped; and
r = discount rate.
The land rent function R(S, t) represents the upper envelope of bid rents of potentially
competing land users at t. The rent for developed land is assumed to be increasing
concave in structural density (RS > 0, RSS < 0). The net rent to developed land is assumed
to be increasing over time (Rt > 0), reflecting an underlying trend growth in the export
sector of the urban area economy relative to the nonurban sector. Also, the cost of
developing the land rises with greater structural density (C0 > 0, C00 Q 0).
The present value of returns to the unit plot of land (at a particular location in the
urban area) is the sum of land rent while in the undeveloped state and the land rent once
developed with structural density S, less the cost of developing the parcel, or






R S; tð Þertdt  C Sð ÞerT ð1Þ
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RS S; tð Þer T  tð Þdt ¼ C0 Sð Þ ð2Þ
and the timing condition
rC Sð Þ þ w ¼ R S; Tð Þ ð3Þ
The density condition requires that the present value of incremental rent from greater
density equals the additional development cost. The timing condition requires that the
developer wait until the annualized cost of development, rC, plus the opportunity cost of
the land, w, equals the land rent from developing the land, R.
It is useful to note at this point that the above formulation includes Anderson’s (1986)
model in which structural density is implicit. The connection between the Fujita-
Wheaton-Turnbull (FWT) type models with explicit structural density and Anderson’s
framework can be seen by solving the optimal density condition (2) for density as an
implicit function of development time, S(T ), then substituting into the objective function
(1) to obtain ~V Tð Þ ¼ V S Tð Þ; Tð Þ. Denote f(T, t) = R(S(T ), t) and ~C Tð Þ ¼ C S Tð Þð Þ to
obtain an analog to Anderson’s objective function:






f T ; tð Þertdt  ~C Tð ÞerT ð4Þ
from which the optimal development timing follows
r~C Tð Þ þ w ¼ f T ; Tð Þ ð5Þ
which is readily recognized as parallel to (3).5
Although we could proceed directly from the optimality conditions (2) and (3) or (5),
it turns out that using a hybrid of both FWT’s and Anderson’s approaches is a more
convenient way to illustrate the investor’s optimal timing-density choice that will allow
us to more readily address the land regulation issues considered later.
For the single tract of land under examination, when the competing demands for
alternative uses are changing over time such that the current best use has a lower
structural density than a future best use, then RSt > 0 in terms of the model above and the
Bdemanded density^ is said to be rising over time (Wheaton, 1982; Turnbull, 1988b).
This is pictured as the dd curve in the lower panel of Figure 1. As the development time
is postponed, the best use for that time entails greater structural density, hence the curve
depicting development time and the best use at that time is upward sloped. On the other
hand, when the underlying demand conditions yield a current best use that has a higher
structural density than a future best use, then RSt < 0 in the above model and the
demanded density is said to be falling over time. This case is pictured as the dd curve in
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the lower panel of Figure 2. Projects developed later entail a lower structural density in
this case.6
Regardless of the underlying source of the slope of the dd curve, the resultant
relationship between development timing and the best type of project to pursue does not
answer the question of the best time to develop the land. The upper panels in Figures 1
and 2 portray the timing condition (5). For an undeveloped parcel of land, the decision of
when to develop is essentially one of deciding how long to wait before investing in the
capital improvements that will make the real estate most marketable. By postponing the
development process, the investor saves the (annualized) cost of capital for the structures
and other improvements that would be put into place when the land is developed. In
addition, the land might earn income as agricultural, forestry, or recreational property,
 
 
Figure 1. Effect of development prohibition threat on planned timing and density when demanded density is
rising over time.
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but can be fallow just as well. This cost savings (plus any agricultural earnings) is the
marginal benefit of waiting, the left hand side term of (5), which is depicted by the MB
curve in the figures.7 At the same time, any postponement of the development time
beyond a given year means that the investor forgoes what the land would have earned as
developed property during the year. These forgone earnings represent the marginal cost
of waiting, the right hand side of (5), which is reflected in the MC curve in Figures 1 and
2. Since the demand for urban land is growing over time, this (annualized) return is
rising over time and the MC curves are upward sloped in general.
The most profitable time to develop is when the marginal benefit and marginal cost of
waiting are equal; the investor’s planned development time is T1 in Figures 1 and 2.
Reading from the bottom panels, the planned structural density is S1.
Figure 2. Effect of development prohibition threat on planned timing and density when demanded density is
falling over time.
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3. Regulation and property rights
The problem confronting land owners and developers is that, regardless of its
justification from the perspective of broader community welfare, land use regulations
restrict the exercise of private property rights. The benefits of such regulation accrue to
residents of the jurisdiction. The costs of regulation, on the other hand, fall on the
property owner in the form of diminished value. Of course, in some cases this can be
justified as elimating a property value premium that arose only because the property
owner was free to impose costs on others. Nonetheless, the consequence of the regulation
is typically evident in the form of diminished property value.
3.1. Land use regulation and takings
When a particular land use regulation substantially reduces the value of the affected
property, even though the owner retains title to the asset, the regulation is equivalent to a
discriminatory tax or exaction. Discriminatory taxes, however, violate the principle of
horizontal equity in taxation. Thus, even narrowly applied land use regulations for
specific goals can lead to capricious reallocations of wealth among individuals and need
to be implemented with due attention to this feature. For two families of equal economic
circumstances at the outset, the one with the greater share of its wealth in undeveloped
land is taxed more heavily by land use regulation than is the other; wealth is reallocated
from the landowning family to the residents of the jurisdiction who benefit directly from
the new land use regulation.
Another aspect of land use regulation also takes a prominent position in the recent
literature. Because land use regulation alters investment incentives for both regulated and
for unregulated property, the unintended consequence of a regulation that is intended to
improve social well-being may be to reduce it.
The importance of the tie between regulation and property values has been recognized
for a long time but has taken on a larger role in recent policy debates over the tension
between regulation and property rights. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
prohibits the taking of property by a government without just compensation to the
owners, but it does not cast a clear and absolute prohibition on regulation that reduces
property values. The Supreme Court recognizes that governments must sometimes
restrict the property rights of one group of individuals in order to protect the property
rights of others or for enhancing the general welfare. In the landmark case Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon, however, Justice Holmes also argued that there is a point after which the
property owner must be compensated for the loss of value arising from the regulation.
One problem with this decision is that it establishes neither a numerical standard nor an
easily interpreted conceptual measure for the loss that property owners must bear before
the burden constitutes a taking and requires compensation.
Recent important Supreme Court cases have honed economists’ interest in regulatory
real estate takings. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of
Tigard, the local governments required that the property owners Bcontribute^ some of
their land to an alternative specified use in order to obtain permission to build on their
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remaining land. Both decisions refine the police power criteria for regulation. In Dolan
the Court decided that the cost borne by the owners passed the takings threshold in that it
placed an excessive burden on the property owners that exceeded the cost to correct the
identified nuisance arising from changes in the drainage pattern. In Nollan the cost borne
by the owners passed the takings threshold in that the regulatory remedy and the
identified nuisance lacked substantial nexus. Relatedly, in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council the U.S. Supreme Court sent the case back to the lower court,
effectively inviting the Coastal Council to justify the regulation as police power in light
of the dimunition of value suffered by the property owner. The parties to that suit settled,
eliminating an opportunity for the Court to further clarify the point. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court used all three of these cases as opportunities to suggest a broader view of
police power than the narrowly construed notion of regulating nuisances.
It is still uncertain where the dividing line lies between a constitutional exercise of
police power and an unconstitutional taking. After all, many land use regulations are
rationalized as attempts to govern nuisances and correct externalities that give rise to
market failure, which justifies them as police power rather than takings in light of the
Court’s comments in Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas. The threat of uncompensated or under-
compensated lost property value remains a relevant concern for U.S. investors in
developable urban land. Investors recognize these risks, so the threat of land use
regulation affects the market pace and pattern of land development. The question is:
precisely how are investment incentives altered?
Before turning to that question, it is interesting to note at this point that even if local
governments are strictly enjoined from engaging in regulatory taking, owners still can
expect to confront uncertainty about land use regulations. For example, suppose that, in
order to avoid being labeled an unconstitutional taking, a particular land use regulation
must be justifiable as legitimate police power. Following the definition above, for a
regulation to be considered an exercise of police power requires that it be imposed to
counter a specific market failure that harms the welfare of individuals in the community.
The existence of likely market failures, however, will only become evident with the
passage of time. Thus, we have the situation envisioned in the earlier eminent domain
literature: investors can never be certain when their land will be taken because the value
of alternative social uses is often revealed only after the passage of time (Miceli, 1991;
Innes, 1997). A similar view pertains to the regulatory environment envisioned here. As
a consequence, the owner of a currently unregulated parcel of land cannot be sure if or
when a legitimate excuse will arise in the future, which would mean that the local
government could then impose the regulation without violating the prohibition on
uncompensated taking. Thus, the requirement that all local land use regulations be
justified as police power does not resolve investors’ uncertainty over the future status of
currently unregulated property.
3.2. Threat of regulation
The impact of land use regulations goes beyond the effect on asset value. The threat of
regulation, whether or not the taking actually occurs, introduces uncertainty into property
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rights, and as a consequence, alters investment incentives. As a broad principle,
uncertainty in property rightsVregardless of its sourceVaffects economic development
in general and the process of urbanization in particular (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1973;
Besley, 1995; Demsetz, 1967; Feder et al. 1988; North and Thomas, 1973; Rosenberg
and Birdzell, 1986; Torstensson, 1994; Miceli et al. 2000, 2003; and Bohn and Deacon,
2000). Poorly defined or uncertain property rights affect the overall level of investment
through several channels. Alchian and Demsetz (1973) and Demsetz (1967) argue that
the threat of expropriation tends to reduce investment, thereby slowing the pace of
economic growth. This is because investors are reluctant to put their capital into projects
whose returns might be appropriated in the indefinite future; as a result investors have
shorter time horizons, favoring projects with rapid payouts over longer term commit-
ments. Feder et al. (1988) emphasize that poorly defined or uncertain property rights
make it difficult to use real estate as collateral, increasing the difficulty of obtaining debt
financing to pursue the long term capital commitments needed for structures and other
improvements to property. This reduction in liquidity hampers capital accumulation in
the economy, thereby slowing economic growth.
The property rights uncertainty that is introduced through land use regulation by local
and regional governments, however, has its primary effects on investment through
different channels than envisioned by Alchian and Demsetz (1973) or Feder et al. (1988).
Since land use regulations typically restrict the quantity and type of capital improve-
ments that can be applied to specific parcels of land, they are clearly not the same as out-
right expropriation of private land and capital by governments. Land use regulations also
need not affect the liquidity of the real estate in question, although they can reduce the
market value of the regulated (and, as argued here, even the unregulated) real estate.
Nonetheless, the economic consequences of land use regulation has two levels. At one
level, the regulation places direct restrictions on investment decisions, limiting the range
of options open to property owners and thereby narrowing property rights. At a deeper
level, though, even when not imposed, the threat of regulation itself alters private
property rights by restricting landowners’ perceived options. That is, the mere threat of
regulation affects investment incentives. This is the main focus of recent land use
regulation research: precisely how this perceived threat affects development incentives.
Riddiough (1997) and Turnbull (2002, 2004a) examine how the modified private
property rights under threatened regulation affect the timing and density of development
in an urban land market. The consequences of distorting urban land development
incentives should not be taken lightly. Given the large commitment of resources that
such development requires and the irreversibility of such investment, inefficient resource
allocation decisions at the initial development stage can have long lasting effects. The
imprint of past decisions are observed on the face of today’s urban areas; investment
distortions, from whatever source, can be significant because their consequences extend
long into the future.
Turning briefly to the underlying methodology issue, the dynamic approach to
modeling land development is essential to these papers for several reasons. First, it turns
out that static model predictions generally do not extend to the dynamic case when
development is irreversible, whether regulation is certain or uncertain. This has been
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illustrated by Titman (1985), Geltner et al. (1996), and Turnbull (1991), who present
dynamic analyses of land markets in which land use regulations are imposed in a way
that all investors know with certainty their form and function.
The discussion below does briefly address these papers, given their role as a starting
point for motivating the subsequent focus on the uncertain nature of land use
regulationVat least from the investors’ perspective. This view emphasizes that the
threat of regulation is an important factor. The threat creates incentives for investors to
attempt to reduce the risk of exposing their land and capital investments to regulation,
leading to distortions in the pace and pattern of planned investment. The research
discussed in the following sections also shows that these distortions generally differ from
the effects of regulation under certainty.
4. Prohibiting development
This section considers the case where a regulatory taking is in the form of development
prohibition, drawing primarily from relevant parts of Turnbull (2002). The regulatory
restrictions in the cases Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Dolan v. City of
Tigard, and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, mentioned above, are examples of
the type of development prohibition examined here. In a different vein, Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) policies regarding the development of wetlands and watershed
land fall within this case as well. While the EPA prohibits developing wetlands,
permission or waivers can be obtained. Whether or not an owner can obtain a waiver,
however, is not something that is known with certainty until after the application is
made. And the application is not going to be made until the demand for a particular type
of developed land has sufficiently matured in the market to make such development
feasible. Thus, prior to initiating the development process, it remains uncertain whether
or not the development will be prohibited; the regulation in effect remains only a threat
of prohibition until actually implemented.
Similarly, the endangered species act (ESA) provides another example of this type of
regulation. An owner of undeveloped land may have evidence that the property is the
habitat of a protected species. The absence of such evidence, however, does not establish
that the property is not a habitat of some protected species. In this case maybe a more
stringent search would reveal such evidence. Perhaps the fortuitous discovery of a novel
butterfly by a naturalist trespasser on the property will provide the evidence needed in
invoke the ESA development restrictions. Or, it may be that a species known to be living
on the land in question that is currently not protected may be designated as protected at
some future date. In any event, ESA creates a degree of uncertainty over possible
development restrictions that might arise in the indefinite future.
In order to assess the impact of the threat of development prohibition on the property,
first note that the developer retains unfettered ownership until (and if ) the government
imposes the regulatory restriction at a particular point in time. Whether or not such a
restriction will be imposed on the property by the regulatory body is only probable,
though, and the point in time at which it might be imposed (if ever) is not known with
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certainty by the investor. Recall that this view of land use regulation as stochastic or
uncertain recognizes the constraints imposed upon state and local governments in the
U.S., since they cannot impose restrictions on a particular parcel of land until they can
assert with some degree of confidence (in the face of an otherwise likely legal challenge)
that such regulation can be justified as contributing to the common welfare.
In all cases considered here, the government does not take outright possession of the
land. The government does, however, reduce land value by restricting the range of
allowed development. Of course, this type of restriction is only meaningful for un-
developed land. Once a particular tract of land is developed, the irreversibility of land
improvements erases any remaining threat of this kind of regulation for the tract.
The regulatory environment envisioned here can be represented by a stochastic
survival model, with p(t) the probability of the regulation not having been imposed by
time t, where the probability of vacant land continuing to avoid regulation decreases over
time, or _p < 0. The expected present value of returns to the unit plot of land is now
V S; Tð Þ ¼ w
r
þ p Tð Þ
ð1
T
R S; tð Þ  w½ ertdt  p Tð ÞC Sð ÞerT ð6Þ
The landowner is assured the present value of nonurban rents, w/r, the first right hand
side term above, regardless of whether or not the development is ever prohibited on this
plot of land. The only question is whether or not the owner is going to be allowed to
garner the excess of rents from the developed land over and above the nonurban rents
(the last two terms on the right hand side above). For the planned development time T,
the expected return to development must be weighted by the probability that such
development will still be allowed at that time, p(T ). The net return above the flow of
urban rents is therefore uncertain, depending upon the regulatory decisions made
between the initial time and the planned development time.
The investor’s optimal structural density condition remains unchanged, as (2) above.
The development timing condition, however, is modified by the regulatory risk.
Differentiating V with respect to T for the first order condition and rearranging yields
the new timing condition
rC Sð Þ þ w ¼ R S; Tð Þ  _p Tð Þ
ð1
T
R S; tð Þ  w rC Sð Þ½ er Ttð Þdt ð7Þ
When expressed in this way, we can see the structure of the problem confronting the
investor and how a development prohibition policy affects development incentives.
Consider a particular tract of undeveloped land. Given that development is not currently
prohibited, an investor can either build on the land now or can choose to wait. If the
decision is to wait, however, the investor is then also opening himself to the risk that the
development prohibition will be imposed at some point in the future before the land is
developed. In any case, when making the decision to develop the land today (for the
current best use) or wait until later (for the future best use), potential investors weigh
the returns to the current and future best uses. But, investors also weigh the threat of
the development prohibition being imposed before the land is developed if they choose
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to wait in order to develop the land for the future best use. The regulatory threat increases
the riskiness of the investment returns from waiting to build on the land. From today’s
perspective, this risk is an additional cost of waiting,  _p Tð ÞÐ1
T
R S; tð Þ  w rC Sð Þ½ 
er T  tð Þdt > 0 (since the probability of the parcel of land staying unregulated decreases
over time, or _p < 0). This regulatory risk cost shifts the expected marginal cost of
waiting upward to MC0 in the top panel of Figure 1. The additional risk introduced by
the threatened regulation will tip the comparison of the development options in favor
of an earlier development time than would otherwise be the case; the planned waiting
time for the parcel pictured in Figure 1 is shortened from T1 to T2. The threat of the
regulation, rather than the regulation itself, creates an incentive to hasten the pace of
development.
The effects on the structural density of the development follow from the effect on
timing and can be seen using the lower panels of Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 pictures the
case where the current best use has a lower structural density than a future best use. For
parcels of land for which this holds, the lower panel shows that the shorter planned
waiting time reduces the planned structural density, from S1 to S2. Figure 2 pictures the
case where the current best use has a higher structural density than a future best use. In
this case, the lower panel in the diagram shows that the shorter waiting time increases the
planned structural density. The effect of the regulatory risk on structural density
therefore systematically depends upon whether the demanded density is rising or falling
over time.
To summarize for unregulated property, the threat of a development prohibition
shortens the waiting time for land development, increasing the pace of development for
unregulated property. The threat of development prohibition decreases the density of
development at locations where the demanded density is rising over time, that is, at those
locations in the urban area where the current best use entails a lower structural density
than does the future best use. On the other hand, the threat of development prohibition
increases the density of development at locations where the demanded density is falling
over time, that is, at locations where the current best use entails a higher structural
density than does the future best use.
For property that actually becomes subject to the regulation before it is developed, of
course, development is prohibited and therefore does not take place, regardless of the
owner’s initial plans.
Note that the discussion to this point also illustrates how the threatened policy elicits
an opposite effect than intended. For example, when greenspace or watershed restrictions
are imposed in one region in a spatial land market, any belief by landowners that the
policy could be expanded to a wider region will increase the pace and density of
surrounding development if policy-makers cannot credibly commit to restricting the
development policy to the narrower targeted region. As stated earlier, the problem from
the policy-makers’ perspective is how to credibly commit to potential investors to never
imposing a similar regulation outside the original targeted region. This difficulty is
especially acute for local and regional land use planning authorities, given that the
political pressure by local residents to do so will likely increase in the future as urban
growth continues.
370 TURNBULL
5. Regulating development timing
Instead of an outright prohibition on developing a specific parcel of land, the local
government can impose a moratorium, postponing development of any sort until a
specified date. There are basically two broadly defined situations in which development
moratoria are threatened. One example is provided by the Portland, Oregon,
Metropolitan Council (Metro). The Metro is a regional authority charged with the
responsibility of delineating the urban service boundary (growth boundary) for the
Portland metropolitan area, and acting as a venue for local governments to coordinate
their own zoning and land use regulations. The Metro Council long range planning
envisions an urban land preserve in the interior of the metropolitan area, a large tract of
land that is to be left undeveloped until 2020, after which private owners will be free to
develop their land for urban uses.8 Similar examples appear repeatedly throughout the
US. For example, the City of Atlanta imposed local development moratoria in parts of
the city where the aging sewer system has failed to meet federal standards. As in the
Portland urban preserve example, Atlanta’s development restriction is not permanent; the
Atlanta moratoria will be lifted once the requisite repairs are in place for each affected
area.
Another example of local development moratoria passing constitutional muster is
addressed in the 2002 Supreme Court decision, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. The Court decided that what had turned into a six year
moratorium on land development was not an unconstitutional regulatory taking as the
plaintiff’s claimed, but was instead an example of police power allowing the planning
agency to ponder alternative development policies. Such moratoria are not unusual, as
the Court notes that Bthe consensus in the planning community appears to be that
moratoria, or Finterim development controls_ as they are often called, are an essential
tool of successful development.^ In any event, the Supreme Court avoided setting a
bright-line rule for how long a Btemporary^ moratorium must extend in order for it to fall
into the category of a taking in the form of an effective lease-hold requiring
compensation for affected owners. The regulatory threat concept is also relevant for
this case. While the Court pointed out that property owners should have Bknown^ years
earlier that some sort of regulation was Bin the works^V the moratorium that finally
occurred years later in 1981V the precise date of the regulation was nonetheless
uncertain to investors during the time leading up to its actual imposition.
These examples illustrate that development moratoria are feasible policies for local
governments. The question is how the threat of such a moratorium alters development
incentives. The general principles for this case are best seen by modifying the setting
envisioned in the previous section, following the relevant analysis in Turnbull (2004a).
This paper incorporates a model of credible government behavior, unlike the earlier
views of regulation as an exogenous stochastic process (Riddiough, 1997). To begin,
recall that a greenspace externality is an external benefit from undeveloped land that
disappears once the land is developed. Investors do not know with certainty at the outset
whether or not a particular parcel of vacant land is a source of a greenspace externality.
Evidence of the externality, or even if it is ever going to be present, only becomes
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evident over time. If the government’s goal is ex post efficiency, the government will
pursue the corrective regulation when evidence of the externality arisesVthe government
follows the Pareto rule identified in the eminent domain literature (Fischel and Shapiro,
1988). If the moratorium is permanent, then this case reverts to the previous situation in
which further development is prohibited outright, which is the case examined in the
preceding section. If the moratorium is not permanent, though, the developer will be
allowed to proceed after the designated interval of time has passed.
It is obvious that regulatory risk arises when there is no constitutional restraint on local
government regulatory behavior. But the strict no taking constraint also introduces
regulatory uncertainty because the government can impose the efficient development
moratorium on a specific parcel of land only after the externality is known to exist for
that parcel. This gives the rationale for the government’s behavior as ex post efficient or
following the Pareto rule.9 Even if the government were inclined to exercise the
moratorium capriciously, it cannot do so because of the no taking constraint. As a result,
because the existence of an externality for the land parcel is uncertain at any point in
time, the regulation must be uncertain as well.
Consider the private investor’s behavior under such a policy. The planning authority
imposes a development holiday on the land only when (and if ) it is revealed to be the
source of a greenspace externality. This policy, although efficient after the fact for
regulated land, creates a risk of regulation for a broad swath of landowners in the locale,
whether or not ultimately falling under the development moratorium. It turns out that the
structure of this problem requires a dynamic programming framework to capture the
effect of the policy threat on investor incentives. Rather than work through the details,
this discussion employs graphs similar to those above to illustrate the forces at work.
Since there is no risk of a development moratorium once the land has been developed,
we only need to focus on how the moratorium threat affects investment decisions before
actual development takes place. From a potential investor’s perspective, at any point in
time only one of two regulatory events can occur given that the moratorium has not yet
been imposed. Either the development moratorium is imposed at that time or it is not.
We start with the first case.
If the moratorium is imposed, the investor’s best strategy is straightforward: develop
the land as soon as it is allowed, say at time Tm. And, when finally developing the land,
develop it in the configuration or use that the market demands at the allowed
development time, which is Sm in Figures 3 and 4. This simple investment timing rule
makes sense. After all, when the development moratorium is imposed, it is intended to
postpone the developer’s decision. The investment density rule also makes sense when
the moratorium is in effect; the most profitable development pattern in earlier years when
the unrestricted developer would have pursued the project will likely not be the most
profitable project in later years when the market for alternative land use configurations
has matured. Therefore, when actually imposed, the moratorium affects the ultimate use
to which the regulated land is put. We can easily see this using the bottom panels of
Figures 3 and 4. When the future best use entails a higher structural density than the current
best use (that is, when demanded density is increasing over time), forcing the regulated
property to postpone development from the planned time T1 to Tm leads to the property
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being developed for a use with greater structural density than it otherwise would have
without the moratorium: Sm > S1 in Figure 3. On the other hand, when the future best use
entails a lower structural density than the current best use (that is, when demanded density
is decreasing over time), the development moratorium leads to a lower structural density
than otherwise would have been the case for the regulated tract of land: Sm < S1 as depicted
in Figure 4.
While the preceding deals with what happens when the moratorium is actually imposed,
there is also the second possible regulatory outcome at any point in time, that the
moratorium is not imposed. In this case the developer’s best strategy is to wait until what
would be the planned development time without regulatory restriction, T2 in Figures 3
and 4. This planned development time, however, is still affected by the future threat of
the moratorium being imposed. The longer the land remains undeveloped, the longer it
Figure 3. Effect of development moratorium threat on planned timing and density when demanded density is
rising over time.
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remains exposed to the potential regulation, which increases the probability that it will
be regulated before development. But once developed, the threat of the governmentally
imposed postponement disappears. Thus, investors face an additional holding cost when
waiting for the land market to mature for their most desired project. This additional
holding or waiting cost shifts the marginal cost of waiting upward toMC0 in the top panel
of Figures 3 and 4, which in turn provides and incentive to develop the land sooner
than without the threat; planned waiting time is shorter (T2) than without the regulatory
threat (T1). Put somewhat differently, the risk of being forced to postpone development
eliminates some feasible alternative projects from consideration, thereby reducing the
option value of vacant land as a source of potential development projects (Riddiough,
1997). The reduction in the vacant land value makes earlier development desirable.
Figure 4. The effect of development moratorium threat on planned timing and density when demanded density
is falling over time.
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This acceleration of the planned development time also affects the way in which
unregulated land is ultimately developed, as can be seen from the bottom panels of the
figures. When the future best use entails a higher structural density than the current best
use, the shorter planned waiting time to development prompts investors to prepare the
property for a use with lower structural density than they would have without the
threatened moratorium (S2 < S1 in Figure 3). On the other hand, when the future best use
entails a lower structural density than the current best use, the threatened development
moratorium leads to a higher structural density than otherwise would have been the case
for that particular tract of land (S2 > S1 in Figure 4).
Pulling these results together, the threat of a development moratorium speeds the
planned development time and either increases or decreases the planned development
density as demanded density is falling or rising over time. Land that escapes regulation is
therefore developed more quickly than without the regulatory threat, with the appropriate
change in density following the demanded density pattern. Of course, some of the land
awaiting development will inevitably get caught by the regulation. This land will be
developed at a later date than it would if it had instead escaped the moratorium, but now
the structural density is greater or less than for unregulated land as the demanded density
is rising or falling over time, respectively. Nonetheless, the moratorium does not force all
developers in the market to pursue their projects at the earliest feasible date; rather they
must balance the risk of the moratorium against the gains from postponing the devel-
opment time as the market for the planned project matures to its most profitable state.
To summarize, the threat of a development moratorium gives investors an incentive to
prefer projects with shorter waiting times than they would otherwise prefer without the
threat. Investors’ incentives favor projects with a lower structural density than without
the threat at locations in the urban area at which the current best use structural density is
lower than the structural density of the future best use (i.e., the demanded density is
rising over time). The threat of a moratorium prompts investors to favor projects with a
higher structural density than without the threat at locations where the current best use
structural density is higher than the future best use structural density (i.e., the demanded
density is falling over time).
Of course, different types of property in the urban area will differ by their likelihood
of being identified with the externality, hence being an intended target of the regulation.
High risk land will have a greater upward shift in the MC curve and therefore a more
rapid planned development pace than otherwise identical low risk land, where the
relative risk reflects the market’s estimate of the likelihood that the specific parcel of
land will be subject to the regulation at some time in the foreseeable future. In addition,
the planned capital density for high risk land will be greater than that for low risk land at
those locations where the demanded density is falling over time. Similarly, the planned
capital density for high risk land will be less than that for low risk land at those locations
where the demanded density is rising over time.
So, how does lengthening the development moratorium (when it is imposed) affect
investors’ incentives? In terms of Figures 3 and 4, shifting the allowed development time
Tm to the right increases the upward shift in the MC curve in the upper panels, as it
increases the expected cost (in the form of lost profits) of the probable moratorium.
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Clearly, the greater this shift in MC, the greater the difference between the planned
development time under the regulatory threat, T2, and that without such a threat, T1.
Also, the greater the reduction from T1 to T2, the lower (higher) is S2 relative to S1 in
Figures 3 and 4, respectively. Thus, lengthening the moratorium decreases the planned
structural density for land at locations where the demanded density is rising over time;
lengthening the moratorium increases the structural density at locations where the
demanded density is falling over time.
The results have important implications for the unintended distorting effects of the
regulatory threat in the broader land market as well. Generally, the greater the possible
externality associated with the undeveloped land, the longer the duration of the efficient
development holiday. Therefore, the preceding paragraph implies that land that might
generate a larger greenspace externality will have a more rapid planned development
pace than land that might generate a smaller greenspace externality. The divergence
between investors’ strategies and efficient outcomes for unregulated land is greater the
greater the possible size of the greenspace externality elsewhere in the market. Simply
put, a greater potential externality drives a larger wedge between private investors’
development timing and the economically efficient timing.
6. Restricting uses when regulation is certain
The series of papers by Titman (1985) and Turnbull (1991, 2002) study how restrictions
on development density affect investment incentives and urban development. This
section discusses the effects of zoning or other land use regulations in the form of
maximum density restrictions. The discussion of this type of regulation is by necessity
more complicated than the development prohibitions or moratoria discussed in previous
sections. A wide range of zoning restrictions (by allowed use type, etc.) can be included
in this density restriction characterization, given that different uses generally entail
different land-structure configurations, hence structural densities.
6.1. Density restrictions under certainty
When the structural density is regulated, say as a maximum allowed density M, the
investor’s problem is modified to
max
S;T






R S; tð Þertdt  C Sð ÞerT s:t: S  M ð8Þ
A binding structural density constraint means that the investor sets S = M, and the density
condition (2) becomes irrelevant. The timing condition is also much simplified: the
investor should develop during the period for which the allowed structural density M is
the Bcurrent^ best use. As a consequence, this type of binding restriction speeds
development where the demanded density is falling over time and slows development
where the demanded density is rising over time (Turnbull, 1991).
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This timing relationship makes sense. As illustrated in the bottom panels of Figures 5
and 6, when the maximum allowed structural density, M, is less than what the investor’s
most profitable development scheme would call for (e.g., S1), then the land use
restriction is binding on the development. Investors have an incentive to adopt the
allowed use, which is the best use for an earlier development time than that most
preferred when the demanded density is rising over time; Tm < T1 in Figure 5. When the
demanded density is falling over time, on the other hand, the allowed use is the best use
for a later development time than that most preferred without the regulation; Tm > T1 in
Figure 6. Once again the determining factor for how the regulation affects development
patterns rests with the underlying pattern of growth in the demands for alternative land
uses over time.
Figure 5. Effect of known density restriction on timing and density when demanded density is rising over time.
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6.2. Density restrictions under demand uncertainty
Now consider a different setting. Suppose that the land use regulation is imposed with
certainty as in the preceding example. Now, however, the land market is uncertain.
Specifically, assume that the demand for developed real estate (e.g., building units) is
stochastic so that the future price of building units is uncertain. Titman (1985) offers a
model of how the introduction of nonstochastic development restrictions affects land
value when future returns to development are uncertain. The framework is a simple
option pricing model extending over two periods. The discussion here differs from
Titman’s original construction in order to emphasize the underlying valuation concept.
The general setting is as follows. There are two periods. In the absence of regulation,
in the current period an investor is free to construct structures, with the number of
Figure 6. Effect of known density restriction on timing and density when demanded density is falling over
time.
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building units per unit of land S, at the cost C(S) as above. Building units can be sold
outright in the initial period for the market price P0. With the riskless interest rate r and
no depreciation, rented units earn rP0 during the period. The market price of a building
unit in the second period is uncertain. It will either rise to P1 or fall to P2 (i.e., P2 < P0 <
P1). Any land left vacant in the first period can be developed in the second period; the
profit to the owner of vacant land in the second period is either (S1) or (S2), where Si is
the profit-maximizing structural density when the price for a building unit is Pi. It
follows that (S1) > (S2).
When cast this way, vacant land in the first period represents an option on future
buildings. The portfolio comprising one building unit coupled with selling short h units
of vacant land (options on future buildings) has the initial value P0 j hV and evolves
following according to one of the two indicated outcomes:
P0  hV !
rP0 þ P1  h S1ð Þ





Of course, which outcome will ultimately obtain is unknown at the outset. Setting the
two second period portfolio values equal to one another and solving for the riskless
hedge ratio yields
h* ¼ P1  P2
 S1ð Þ   S2ð Þ ð10Þ
Since h* yields a riskless portfolio, the initial portfolio must earn the riskless rate of
return in equilibrium, so that
P0  h*Vð Þ 1þ rð Þ ¼ rP0 þ P1  h* S1ð Þ ð11Þ
and value of vacant land at the outset is













In equilibrium, land is developed in period one up to the point where (S0) = V. This
implies that factors increasing V slow the pace of development (in the sense that less land
is developed in the initial period and more held to exploit future development options)
while factors decreasing V speed the pace of development.10
The effect of a land use restrictions is easily seen from (12). Suppose we now place a
binding constraint either on the maximum (M < S1) or minimum allowed structural
density (m > S1). Either case reduces second period development profit (land rent) in the
higher or low price states: (M ) < (S1) or (m) < (S2). By (12), each of these
restrictions reduces the value of vacant land, V, and speeds the development pace.
Intuitively, the land use regulation reduces the range of allowable options for
development, reducing the option value of vacant land, and lowering the hurdle for
current period investment decisions to proceed.
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This conclusion contrasts with the results for such regulation under complete certainty.
Recall from Figures 5 and 6 that regulating allowed structural density either speeds or
slows development when demand is certain, depending upon how the demanded density
is changing over time. On the other hand, the previous sections show that development
proceeds at a more rapid pace in response to a threatened development moratorium or
prohibition, outcomes that look similar to that found here with the option value model.
So, what explains the difference in regulatory effects on the pace of development? It
turns out that there are different forces at work. In part, the conclusions in the certainty
model hinge upon the assumption that investors know both the regulatory regime and
market outcomes with certainty; all land in the market is already zoned according to
allowable final use and there will be no changes or variances in the future.
Although providing a good starting point for the ensuing line of research, this
characterization of zoning is, of course, not an accurate depiction of how land use
regulation is devised and put into play over time. A more realistic picture recognizes that
zoning and other types of allowed density restrictions can be the source rather than
resolution of uncertainty facing investors (Ellson and McDermott, 1987). Zoning plans
change over time in response to local political pressures by residents and developers as
well as the observed evolving patterns of land use in the urban area. Even when the
zoning pattern is set, it is possible to obtain variances. Future changes and variances are,
of course, by their nature uncertain. These observations motivate the question addressed
in the next section, how uncertainty over future density regulation affects the urban land
development process.
7. Uncertain density restrictions
Turnbull (2002) combines the probabilistic structure of the regulation envisioned in the
previous section with the type of density restrictions envisioned in the certainty model of
zoning or land use controls in order to evaluate the net effect of the policy on investment
patterns. This discussion focuses on allowed use regulations that effectively place an
upper bound on the allowed structural density, regulations that rule out high density
developmentVunless, of course, a zoning variance is obtained, which is uncertain until
applied for.
To keep the description as straightforward as possible, the regulatory environment is
envisioned as one beginning with no density restriction. Over time, a binding density
restriction might or might not be imposed. Of course, imposing a non-binding density
restriction is equivalent to no restriction. If the most profitable use for the land would be
single family detached houses and the zoning restriction prohibits nonresidential uses for
which multi-story office buildings or large commercial structures would be appropriate,
then the restriction is not binding on developers’ decisions. It seems reasonable to infer
that the uncertain density restriction model also pertains to the situation in which the
maximum allowed density is imposed at the outset, but whether or not a variance will be
allowed will not be known until applied for at a later date. However envisioned, the basic
model described here remains the same.
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A complete treatment of this case requires solving a dynamic programming problem.
This discussion, however, remains informal in order to tease out the intuition underlying
several of the key results. Looking at the effects of development timing first, given the
results discussed in previous sections, it is not surprising that the threat of restrictions on
allowed use creates a regulatory risk that can be interpreted as an additional holding cost
for undeveloped land. Graphically, the waiting cost shifts upward to MC0 in Figures 7
and 8. Once again, the regulatory threat hastens the overall pace of development for
unregulated land as the planned development waiting time decreases from T1 to T2. In
this case, though, determining effects on the structural density of unregulated land and
the effects on the timing of the development of regulated land requires a slightly
different approach than followed for the prohibition and moratorium regulations
discussed earlier.
Figure 7. Effect of density restriction threat on planned development timing and density when demanded
density is rising over time.
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Market participants take into account the possibility that the binding land use
restriction might be imposed at some time prior to the planned development time.
Consider a time period before the planned development time for the tract of land, say T0,
when the development restriction has not (yet) been imposed. There are only two
possibilities: either the restriction will not be imposed at that time, possibly to be
imposed at some unspecified future date, or it will be imposed at that time. Consider each
possibility in turn.
First, there is the possibility that the regulation is not imposed at the point in time
envisioned. In this case, the investment strategy is simple: if the current time is the
previously planned development time (T2), then the market for the most profitable use is
ripe and the investor goes forward with the planned project. On the other hand, if the
current time T0 is before the planned development time, the investor’s incentive is to
Figure 8. Case one: Effect of density restriction threat on planned development timing and density when
demanded density is falling over time.
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await T2 and develop at that time. In either case, the investor undertakes the project at the
planned density (S2 in Figures 7 and 8).
Now consider the second possibility, that a binding land use restriction is imposed at
the current time T0. Since the maximum density restriction, M, is binding, it is lower than
the originally planned density, S2, as drawn in Figures 7Y9. The investor’s strategy is to
revise the planned project to coincide with what is now allowed, and then await the
maturing of the allowed project in the market. There are two subcases to examine. For
one, it is possible that the market is already fully matured for the allowed project when
the regulation is imposed. Since the more profitable project for which the investor was
waiting to mature when the land use restriction was imposed is no longer an option, the
investor now has an incentive to immediately develop the land for the allowed use. It
turns out that is will only occur when the demanded density is rising over time for the
Figure 9. Case two: Effect of density restriction threat on planned development timing and density when the
market for the allowed density has fully matured.
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land parcel in question. To see why, suppose that the allowed use restriction is imposed
at time period T0 in Figure 9. With the maximum allowed density M, clearly the best
time to develop is as close to TM as possible; but seeing as the regulation is being
imposed at the current time T0, the best time to develop the land with structural density
TM is already past, so the best option left is to develop the land immediately at the
current time T0.
For the other possibility, though, if the land use restriction is imposed before the
allowed use has fully matured in the market, then investors have an incentive to wait
until the market matures for the allowed use. It turns out that this will always occur when
the demanded density is falling over time for the land parcel in question (as in Figure 8)
and may occur when the demanded density is rising over time (as in Figure 7). In Figures
7 and 8, for example, the maximum allowed density is M; the optimal time to develop
land for that use is the time at which M represents the best use, TM.
Sorting out the effect of the threatened maximum allowed density restriction on
development outcomes depends upon whether the plot of regulated land would be
developed earlier or later when compared to the most profitable time to develop when
left unregulated (but still threatened with regulation). If the best time to build the allowed
land use is later than the best time to build for the most profitable land use (that is, TM >
T2 as in Figure 8), then there is never an incentive to develop the regulated land prior to
the original planned development time (TM > T1). On the other hand, it is possible that
the best time to build for the allowed land use is actually before the best time to build for
the most profitable land use, that is, TM < T2 as pictured in Figures 7 and 9. In this
situation, actually imposing the land use regulation hastens the development time, and
the land will be developed before the originally planned development time (that is, TM <
T2 < T1). What is interesting in this latter case is that imposing the land use restriction
speeds the pace of development of regulated property relative to property that remains
unregulated (TM < T2). Therefore, whether or not imposing the land use restriction slows
or speeds development of regulated land relative to unregulated land is determined in
part by how the demanded density is rising or falling over time.
In summary, the threat of binding land use regulation tends to speed the pace of
development for unregulated property. The effects on structural density depend upon
how the underlying demands for land expressed by different land uses are changing over
time. The imposition of the allowed use regulation has a more complicated effect on
timing decisions than observed for the previous types of regulations, but the outcomes
once again systematically depend upon how the demanded density is changing over time.
8. Regulatory risk versus ownership risk
The above analysis of threatened development prohibition, moratoria, and density
restrictions reveal a basic principle: all create an additional risk cost associated with
holding undeveloped land, thereby creating greater incentive for investors to develop
property more quickly. This prompts a relevant question in light of the broader literature
on property rights and urban development. For example, Miceli et al. (2000, 2003)
384 TURNBULL
examine how ownership risk arising from private sources, like boundary encroachment,
squatting, title system errors, or the other complications, affects development. Is the
effect of public sector regulation risk comparable to that from these private sources of
property rights risk?
Not surprisingly, the stochastic structure implied by ownership risk arising from
private sources differs from that arising from the public regulations examined above.
Suppose that at any given point in time, the current possessor (since Bowner^ is an
ambiguous label in this model) runs the risk of losing title to the property from one of
these private sources of risk. Also assume that the only property rights conflict that might
arise is associated with the land itself. In this case, the current possessor can expect to be
reimbursed for any improvements that were made to the land in good faith if he loses
title to the land. Let p(t) be the survival probability, the probability of retaining title at
time t given that the current possessor retains title up to that time. The expected present
value of returns to the land is11
V S; Tð Þ ¼
ðT
0
p tð Þwertdt þ
ð1
T
p tð Þ R S; tð Þ  rC Sð Þ½ ertdt ð13Þ
The first right hand side term is the expected rents from the undeveloped land; the rent
at each time period is weighted by the probability that the current possessor will actually
maintain title to the land long enough to enjoy those rents. The second term is the
expected net return from the developed land; the rent (less rental cost of structural
improvements) is again weighted by the probability p(t).
The investor’s optimal structural density and timing satisfy the following conditions
ð1
T
p Tð ÞRS S; tð Þertdt ¼ C0 Sð Þ
ð1
T
rp tð Þertdt ð14Þ
Consider how the current best use structural density at a given development time T
is altered by this type of private ownership risk. Since the probability p inside the left
hand side integral is decreasing over time, when RSt > 0 the presence of this probability
reduces the value of the integral for given values of S and T. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that the presences of this probability tends to reduce the current best use density
at a given development time: the density-timing curve dd in the lower panel of Figure 10
shifts downward to d0d0 with the introduction of ownership risk. This new density-timing
relationship ~S Tð Þ yields the timing condition under ownership risk as
rC ~S Tð Þ þ w ¼ R ~S Tð Þ; T  ð15Þ
The lower density at each potential development time T lowers the development cost
on the left hand side, thereby lowering the marginal benefit of waiting to MB0 in the
figure. This lower planned density effect also decreases the right hand side of the above
condition, the marginal cost of waiting, shifting it down to MC0. Although not obvious
from the diagram, the reduction in the MC turns out to be less than the corresponding
reduction in MB, and the planned waiting time falls from T1 to T2. The quicker
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development time leads to a lower structural density in the lower panel of the diagram
(S2 < S1) both because the best use density is lower from the risk of losing capital
earnings in the future and because the optimal time to develop is sooner under risk to
ownership.
The implications of ownership risk for the case where demanded density is falling over
time are illustrated in Figure 11. Once again, the presence of such risk changes the dd
curve, but this time the probability inside the integral in the density condition (14) leads
to a higher structural density at each given development time T : ~S Tð Þ > S Tð Þ. This is
reflected in the upward shift in the dd curve to d0d0 in the lower panel. The greater
current best use density yields a timing condition like (15). In this case, though, the
higher ~S Tð Þ at each T increases both sides of (15); the marginal benefit of waiting
shifts upwards to MB0 while the marginal cost shifts upwards by a relatively greater
Figure 10. Effect of private source ownership risk on development timing and density when demanded density
is rising over time.
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amount to MC0. The optimal development time for the investor changes from T1 to T2,
and the ensuing change in development density rises in this case from S1 to S2.
Thus, even though the structure of risk to ownership is different when arising from
private sources than when arising from threatened government regulation, we see in both
cases that investors have an incentive to accelerate their development plans whenever
possible. And the effects on structural density also depend upon how the underlying
demands for land are changing over time. When put side-by-side, private ownership risk
has effects on planned timing similar to that of threatened regulation.
Nonetheless, there is an important difference between private and regulatory sources
of risk to property rights. The difference arises in the part of the market that actually ends
up subject to the land use regulation. With private source risk, of course, there is no
distinction between affected and unaffected property. In contrast, with regulatory risk,
Figure 11. Effect of private source ownership risk on development timing and density when demanded density
is falling over time.
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we see a profound difference between how unregulated and regulated property is
affected. For example, the discussion in the preceding section illustrates that the threat of
an upper bound on structural density generally hastens the development of regulated land
where the demanded density is rising over time while slowing the development of
regulated land where the demanded density is falling over time. As a consequence this
particular regulatory regime threat can lead to faster or slower development of regulated
land on average across the land market, depending upon patterns of growth in the
underlying land demands at each of the affected locations. Private source ownership risk,
on the other hand, unambiguously leads to faster development on average across the land
market.
9. Development fees
Development fees can increase efficiency when public services or infrastructure are
subject to decreasing returns to scale or congestion or when vacant land is the source of
greenspace externalities (Brueckner, 1997). In practice, though, local governments view
development fees as just another source of revenue. In Georgia, for example, local
governments have been able to exploit fungibility and broad interpretations of the state
enabling legislation in order to use revenues raised from development fees to repair long
neglected infrastructure and even to support new services in older developed
neighborhoods. None of these uses bear much resemblance to the corrective tax
envisioned by economists.12 Regardless of the motivation, whether applied as corrective
Pigovian taxes to control development or used simply as another revenue source,
development fees remain popular among local governments in many states.
Looking at their impact, development fees represent an additional cost of development
to investors and will in general slow the development pace throughout the jurisdic-
tionVprovided that the fees are both imposed with certainty and are invariant with
respect to planned development density. There are, however, two dynamic aspects of
development fees considered here.
To do so, let the development fee D(S) be due at the time of development, where D0 >
0 when the fee rises with structural density and D0 = 0 when it is levied as a lump-sum
tax. The present value of returns to a unit of land is (1) less the tax,






R S; tð Þertdt  C Sð Þ þ D Sð Þ½ erT ð16Þ
The investor’s structural density condition isð1
T
RS S; tð Þer T  tð Þdt ¼ C0 Sð Þ þ D0 Sð Þ ð17Þ
Given the density that satisfies this relationship, S(T ), the timing condition becomes
rC S Tð Þð Þ þ rD S Tð Þð Þ þ w ¼ R S Tð Þ; Tð Þ ð18Þ
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The fee will still affect the density of development in the affected region even if the
fee does not vary with planned density. This corresponds to McFarlane’s (1999) case
where the development fee is assessed per unit of land. To see the result, use the fact that
in this case D0 = 0 and the density condition (17) reverts back to the condition with no
taxes or regulatory threat (2) and the density-timing curves in the bottom panels of
Figures 12 and 13 remain dd. The only change is that the timing condition is now
modified only by the addition of the annualized development fee, rD, to the left hand
side; this development fee increases the marginal benefit of waiting to MB0, thereby
slowing the development pace (T1 to T2). McFarlane’s (1999) model is restricted to the
case where demanded density is rising over time, the situation depicted in Figure 12. As
is clear from the diagram, this type of development fee not only postpones planned
Figure 12. Effect of development fee on timing and density when demanded density is rising over time:
Example of a neutral effect on density.
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development, it also increases the structural density from S1 to S2 in the figure. The
framework used here, however, is more general than McFarlane’s in that it also allows
for decreasing demanded density over time. In this case the development fee levied per
unit of land lowers the structural density at such locations, from S1 to S2 in Figure 13.
It is interesting to also note that this development fee does not match slowing
development with the solution to a specific identified market failure attributable to
decreasing returns to scale or congestion externalities that are tied to population rather
than the quantity of land developed. While imposing the development fee slows the
development pace, the policy has varying effects on population, since that effect in part
depends upon how density changes. Nonetheless, such a fee increases the cost of
development when undertaken, slowing the pace of development in the affected region.
But, even aside from the second-best normative concerns raised earlier, there is no
Figure 13. Effect of development fee on timing and density when demanded density is falling over time.
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reason to expect a general slowing of development to necessarily enhance the well-being
of residents in the locale.
When the fee varies with planned structural density (D0 > 0) there is an additional
direct affect on investors’ plans for how to develop the property. In this situation the
development fee becomes a tax on buildings. Static analysis shows that such taxes
generally tend to reduce development density and increase the total area of land that is
developed to accommodate a given population (Brueckner, 1986). In a growing
economy, though, this type of a development fee will also affect the pace of development
(Turnbull, 1988a, 2004b). The question is, how?
When the development fee varies with structural density then the tax has an additional
effect similar to higher marginal development costs. Increasing the marginal development
cost can have a surprisingly wide range of effects in dynamic models (Turnbull, 1988a).
Looking at (17), for example, the greater marginal cost of density decreases the best use
density for each time period, which is reflected in the downward shift of dd to d0d0 in
Figures 12 and 13. Substituting the lower density at each T into the timing condition
lowers the development cost term, but if the presence of the development fee D(~S(T ))
increases the left hand side of the above condition, the MB shifts upwards. The lower
best use density associated with each T decreases the right hand side in the timing con-
dition, shifting the MC downwards in the figures. When the demanded density is falling,
the development fee unambiguously decreases the density from S1 to S3 (Figure 13), a
result consistent with the static analysis. When the demanded density is rising, however,
the fee lowers the density for any given development time (the downward shift in d0d0)
while the slower development pace tends to increase density (the movement along d0d0),
leaving the net effect of the development fee ambiguous. A larger (smaller) shift in dd
than pictured in Figure 12 will lower (raise) the structural density. While increasing
structural density is not what one would expect to find in light of the established static
results, it is nonetheless possible under reasonable conditions in the dynamic context.
This also explains the otherwise surprising neutrality result reported in McFarlane
(1999). That study finds that this type of development fee slows the development pace but
has no effect on planned structural density when technology is Cobb-Douglas. Figure 12
reveals why this is a special case of rising demanded density, which is implicitly assumed
inMcFarlane’s Cobb-Douglas model. The lower panel of the diagram presents an example
of where the downward shift in the d0d0 curve (from the lower best use structural density
due to the tax on structures) just offsets the rightward movement along the d0d0 curve from
the delayed optimal planned development time (which follows from the top panel). As a
result, planned development is delayed by the fee while there is no net change in planned
density.
10. Conclusion
This paper explains the thrust of recent research on how land use regulations affect the
pace and pattern of urban development. The purpose was not to break new ground, but
rather to take a broader view to provide a nontechnical survey and to help uncover any
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discernible general principles or patterns across the different studies. Pulling the results
together, several broad patterns emerge.
The challenges to property rights arising from the threat of land regulation affects
investment incentives differently than property rights uncertainty engendered by unclear
legal standards, capricious enforcement, or public sector corruption. While poorly defined
or defended property rights in general lead to a slower pace of development in an eco-
nomy, the threat of land use regulation generally creates incentives for more rapid devel-
opment than would otherwise be observed in the market. The discussion here provided
an informal explanation for the observed difference and how the specific nature of the
threat to property rights matters when considering the way it alters investment incentives.
The effect of threatened regulation on the planned structural density varies across the
urban area and systematically depends upon the growth pattern in the underlying land
demands by competing land uses. In general, though, regulation risk decreases the
planned structural density at locations where the demanded density is rising over time,
that is, at sites where the current best use has a lower structural density than the future
best use. Similarly, regulation risk increases the planned structural density at locations
where the demanded density is falling over time, or where the current best use has a
higher structural density than the future best use.
These papers provide positive analysis of the regulation-development nexus. The
results give a starting point for formal dynamic welfare analysis, weighing the direct
effects of policy on regulated land against the intertemporal distortions for unregulated
land. Since unregulated land subject to regulatory risk is generally developed more
quickly than is socially efficient, this effect must be taken into account and weighed
against the efficiency gain accomplished by resolving the externality incentives effects
for regulated land. This regulatory compromise is in addition to the second-best effects
identified at the outset. The conclusions that will be derived from research focused on
these and other normative issues are not obvious at this point, but existing studies
suggest that the normative efficiency rules arising from the popular static perspective
will not generalize to the dynamic environment (Turnbull, 2004b). More work must be
done in this direction, however, before we can hope to see general principles emerge for
weighing the relative dynamic efficiency of different regulatory regimes.
There are other important aspects of land use regulation that need to be considered. In
the positive vein, the partial equilibrium results need to be aggregated to the urban area.
The complications here are daunting. Zoning and related types of planning and regu-
lation are often local government functions. Thus, aggregating to the urban area means
that, not only must the intertemporal aggregation across time be tied together through the
capital and property markets, but the property markets must also be aggregated over
multiple jurisdictions, each pursuing their own policies.
As stated at the outset, one goal of this paper was to stimulate further thought and
research on these and related issues concerning land use policies as viewed within a
dynamic context. The other goal, perhaps more important for this particular effort, was to
offer a self contained survey that appeals to a broader audience. Although much
simplified, the graphical device used throughout most of this paper provides a useful
framework with pedagogical as well as analytical value.
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Notes
1. Riddiough (1997) and Turnbull (2002) examine development prohibition, Turnbull (2004a) development
moratoria; and Ellson and McDermott (1987), Geltner et al. (1996), Titman (1985), Turnbull (1991, 2002)
study restrictions on allowed use.
2. See Brueckner (2000) for an overview of dynamic land market models with durable capital or costly
redevelopment.
3. See, for example, Anderson (1986), Arnott and Lewis (1979), Bentick (1979), Kanemoto (1985), Mills
(1981, 1982), Sinn (1986), Tideman (1982), and Turnbull (1988b).
4. The normative consequences are more troublesome, though; the efficient development pace is slower than
the market determined pace, so full compensation is not dynamically efficient.
5. In contrast, models in which the urban rent function, f(t ), is not explicitly a function of development time
represent special cases of the FWT or Anderson versions of the model corresponding to RSt = 0 in the FWT
approach. Turnbull (1988b), however, shows that RSt = 0 can hold for a set of locations with measure zero
within a growing monocentric urban area comprising homogeneous residents. This conclusion is relevant
for dynamic investment timing models using continuous time option pricing formulae. See, for example,
the models used in Geltner et al. (1996) and Riddiough (1997).
6. See Fujita (1982), Turnbull (1988b), and Wheaton (1982) for analysis of the factors determining increasing
or decreasing demanded density at different locations in the same urban area.
7. Differentiating the MB yields MB0 = C0S0(T ), which takes the sign of S0, that is, the slope of the dd curve.
The MB is upward (downward) sloped when the demanded density is rising (falling) over time, as drawn.
8. The urban preserve concept can be intepreted as an officially sanctioned leapfrog development pattern. As
such, the urban preserve policy might be evidence that growth control advocates are beginning to recognize
that leapfrog development is not prima facie evidence of inefficient private markets.
9. The assertion here is that the distinction between police power and regulatory taking prompts local
governments to follow the Pareto rule when exercising land use controls. This ex post efficiency will not
hold to the extent that the standard of proof for police power is low (as in Tahoe-Sierra, as an example). In
any case, this distinction affects the normative interpretation of the results but not the positive effects that
are the primary concern here.
10. The concept of rising or falling demanded density over time is not meaningful in this model. Since
dSi/dPi > 0, the structural density in the second period is greater for P1 than for P2; in terms of the earlier
models, this framework assumes that the demanded density either rises (if P1 realized) or falls (if P2
realized). Further, the expected structural density will either rise or fall over time, depending upon the
underlying probabilities of each outcome.
11. The presence of a statute of limitations can extinguish many prior competing claims so that _p ¼ 0 after that
point (Miceli et al., 2003).
12. The courts in many states apply a three part test for development fees: the fee must be rationalized by some
additional costs or damages associated with the new development, the funds raised by the fee must be
segregated from general revenue funds, and there must be a reasonable possibility that the new residents or
land users will benefit from the expenditures supported by the fee. In application, these criteria do not
identify the fee as a Pigovian corrective tax. They do not require matching the fee with marginal externality
costs and in general they bear at best a strained resemblance to the efficiency rationale articulated by
Brueckner (1997).
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